The Swiss Benedictine poses this question for those who accept as irreversible the development whereby the Church included certain books and excluded others from its Scriptures.
2 He then goes on to say that the issues raised by Hans Rung in Unfehlbar? Eine Anfrage (Zurich, 1970) should provide a stimulus for clarifying the construct jus divinum. 3 Piet Schoonenberg has made an effort to do just that by locating precisely where the problem of divine right lies. In his essay "God or Man: A False Dilemma," he asserts that it is as difficult to draw a line concretely between jus divinum and jus humanum in the sacraments as it is to isolate the divine from the human in historical achievements. 4 If he is correct, then an analysis oí jus divinum should go hand in hand with a consideration of synergism. Where in the endeavors of man the human ends and the divine begins is commonly recognized by Catholic theologians as a pseudo problem. 5 The same would have to be said relative to the compenetration of the divine and human in the origin and conservation of institutions that exist by divine right. Schoonenberg's contention that in human achievements the contributions of God and man do not vary inversely has implications for interpreting a broad range of jus divinum claims. It would follow, for example, that one misunderstands what divine right is all about if he concludes that the more of the human there is in an institution, the less there is of the divine. Of course, his brief remarks should not be construed as if they were intended to sketch a theory of jus divinum. And in this sense Magnus Löhrer is correct: the term in question designates an unfinished theological task. 6 The forego ing points in the direction of a theologia negativa regarding the jus di vinum that is operative in church rite and structure. There are, however, Roman Catholic scholars who have arrived at more positive conclusions. Edward Schillebeeckx is a good example. A systematic theologian, he is concerned with divine law or right in the context of church office. 7 At the outset of an article that has significant ecumenical implications, he affirms the normative character of the past for the Church. Prece dents must be studied, previous history has to be consulted; for in the hermeneutical circle encompassing past and present, each period of the Church's life criticizes and is criticized by that which precedes it. Offices exist in the Church not merely because it is a community but because it is one that is "apostolically ordered." As a result, although there is no di rect link between contemporary church offices and an act of foundation on the part of Jesus, still the threefold office of bishop, presbyter, and deacon is the work of the Spirit of the risen Christ. Furthermore, it is in this sense based on a jus divinum, but one that does not exclude a reor dering of the triadic structure itself. 8 The Catholic notion of office requires that the local church or commu nity of believers preserve its own distinct characteristics. 9 But that same church "has to be 'in communion' with other local churches and with that Church in which the one who bears the office of Peter resides." 10 The pluralism that thus results will be within a necessary unity of Church or der.
Again there is no elaborated theory οι jus divinum here; but there are indications of what any satisfactory theory would have to account for in the view of a Catholic specialist in sacramental theology. Thus the "apos tolic ordering" of the Church is not something Christians have every right to modify exactly as they may choose, or even attempt to do away with altogether should they so desire. This general structure is an antece dently-given, a datum that is not untouchable but must be respected. Thus apostolic office in the Church today requires that the officeholder represent the Christian community over against the world, and con versely Christ and the Spirit over against the Christian community for e Such terms as "revelation" "tradition," "church," "sacrifice," have long since been recognized as due for critical analysis in an ecumenical context; that the same is true of jus divinum should come as no surprise.
7 "The Catholic Understanding of Office in the Church," THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 30 (1969) 567-87. 8 Ibid., pp. 568-69. 9 It is, after all, the Catholic notion to which he is directing his attention in his article. 10 Ibid., p. 571.
the benefit of the world. 11 Furthermore, "even an episcopal or presbyterial structure of the leadership of the Church is not dogmatically inviolate, although the collégial unity of all the 'shepherds' of the Church, with the office-bearer who has the function of Peter in their midst, is."
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Schillebeeckx' article leaves a number of unanswered questions. How precisely does one establish the necessity of the shepherds' being in communion with the "one who has the function of Peter in their midst"? This is a matter of concern to many, but Schillebeckx does not treat it. Why must officeholders in the Church be more than notary publics for the Christian community? Why do they serve by right and not by the mere grace and favor of those ministered to at a particular moment? He really does not say, nor was there any reason why he had to. But where does this leave his notion of jus divinum?
The New Testament offers a number of different ecclesial models, all of which are "apostolically ordered" churches. For this reason, none of those models can in principle be repudiated, none is excluded as no longer viable.
18 Why? Not because of any human ordinance pure and simple but because of a fundamental liberty divinely accorded as the precondition of the religious life of the Christian, because of a pregiven which all Christians without exception must respect (jus divinum). But that liberty is not boundless or unconditioned "apostolically." Thus the possible modes of ecclesial existence do not include every conceivable type of structure. Room must be left for officeholders to exercise a right arising from a power greater than man's. They must be able to lead the community, even at times by opposing its wishes in the name of the risen Christ for the sake of the world. The conditions required for "apostolic" officeholders to issue an authoritative veto may be difficult to spell out and will likely vary according to historical situations. But the right to do so is a datum to be respected in an "apostolically ordered" church. So, too, such a church will not automatically and without difficulty realize in itself all the qualities a church which is Christ's must have. If it is to do this, the necessary condition is that it live in communion with other churches and in particular with the officeholder who exercises the function of Peter. Schillebeeckx surely does not make a complete equation between that function and the way it presently exists in the papacy. Still, he thinks that function cannot be missing from the Catholic notion of office, If one wonders why, his reason seems to be that a unifying principle corresponding to Peter in the New Testament presentation of the apostles is always necessary in the Church and is of divine origin.
Still, it is a fact, as Löhrer has pointed out, that when it comes to explicit reflection on the conditions and implications of jus divinum in Roman Catholic theology, Rahner is in a class by himself.
14 In an early article on the subject, he makes use of an example he thinks will be familiar to Catholic and Protestant Christians: belief in the permanence of the Church through the centuries. In this instance faith means more than that there is a church today following after one that existed in the days of the apostles. The continuum encompassing the Church then and now is more than time. Indeed, there is a dimension common to Christ's Church present in the first century and in the twentieth. That abiding character may, for want of a better term, be called its "nature." There are also the most obvious differences of form in which the Church has appeared from one period to another. If such forms were the total reality, belief in an apostolic church today as a present reality would fly in the face of all evidence. Yet given the distinction, which is the work of reason seeking to understand faith, it must be admitted that no theological scalpel can be applied to separate the dimension of nature from that of form in the concrete. Nor can a laser ray be brought to bear to accomplish this purpose.
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Obscurum per obscurius is not a promising theological method. On closer inspection, however, one can see that this is not a fair indictment of Rahner here. It may help to recall that he took a similar approach in his treatment of nature and grace. Given their nonidentity, which is recognized by faith seeking understanding, they are nevertheless always inseparably connected in some way historically. Hence one simply cannot come up with a chemically pure case of either.
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This distinction between the nature and form of the Church becomes a hermeneutical principle. Rahner brings it to bear on historical data in an attempt to interpret and understand the Church's change within identity rather than of identity. First, he says, structure or form develops precisely because it is historical. But a particular element in that structure is not "reversible" or dispensable simply because it appeared at a particular time and not earlier or later. Biologism in the realm of theology has at times led to bizarre considerations.
18 Still, in this context a comparison of the Church with living beings has much to commend it. Not infrequently, later developments attested to by the New Testament itself are regarded as somehow less normative than earlier ones. Such reasoning would have to be criticized in the light of Rahner's first conclusion. A living organism (individual or social) passes through stages. It remains to be shown, and cannot be simply assumed, that its initial stages can be reassimilated without passing through the equivalent of second childhood. Hence subsequent developments, despite their tardy appearance, may be so decisive as to make it impossible to turn the clock back to the way things were earlier.
Secondly, in a human community a particular pattern of development, rather than another that would have been radically different, may result from a free decision. The nature of the community might well have been patient of either. Neither this type of structure nor that may have been antecedently necessary, and the two may be mutually exclusive. Which one is actually selected will depend on choices that may only subsequently be reflected on critically. And it would not follow that because another course might have been chosen, therefore the option that was made is "reversible." Certain decisions (e.g., a choice of a career as a concert pianist versus one as a nuclear physicist) set up conditions that make a subsequent reversal in favor of a life style that was previously open well nigh impossible. A student may be a double major, in music and architecture; but it will be impossible practically to develop both talents to the same degree. He may opt for one in graduate school; in so doing he expends something of what he might have given to the other, even if later he changes his mind. He cannot relive that prior period; he is different irrevocably. In general, no person, as finite, is able to go back to a previous period of his life. Then he may have been bound simply to one course of action or another by the law of noncoincidence of contradictories, but to this one rather than the other only as the result of free choice. But once that choice has been made, it may be regretted or even retracted to the extent that this is possible. But it is unrepeatable, and its consequences to some extent are irreversible for him as long as he lives.
What do such decisions mean for the individual or community? They are, in Rahner's opinion, more creative than expressive of what had to be. Rather than articulating a law of being, they set up a law for this being. Such decisions in the primitive Church may well give rise to a jus divinum for subsequent ages. Indeed, he sees no reason why a priori and certainly it is impossible to have a jus divinum arise in such a fashion in the postapostolic age, with the "irreversibility" that this would imply. 19 He notes that his reflections on jus divinum are not intended to apply directly to the Roman primacy or the monarchical episcopate in the constitution of the Church. He does not assert that his reflections offer a way of grounding the divine-right claims of those institutions, much less that they are the only way. Nevertheless, it is obvious that his study deserves serious consideration in the context of Roman Catholic thought on divine-right claims.
Can an ordinance that is not clearly binding as a result of the New Testament become an irreversible development in the postapostolic age? Rahner did not rule it out. And to this the Tübingen canonist Johannes Neumann took exception long before the recent controversy regarding papal infallibility. 20 The basis for the difference between the two has to do with the normative character of the New Testament itself. Because these differences regarding the nature and foundation of jus divinum are thus related to attempts to grasp the Bible as norma normans, it is imperative to point out the lack of consensus existing today among Roman Catholics on the latter. proposes as mandatory and avoidance of those it rejects. But does the Christian today recognize language other than the biblical Word (prayerfully and critically understood) as expressing and mediating that same claim? How one answers this question has theological consequences of the first order. Thus, for Hans Küng, replying to the charge that he accords the third chapter of Lumen gentium less importance than others consider its due, the issue must be faced directly. The norm for the Catholic Christian interpreting Vatican II's Constitution on the Church must be the original message of Christ. 22 In context, that original message is the New Testament itself. Traditions that are not contained or recorded in the New Testament cannot be the norma normans. 23 Concerned for the gospel and service to mankind, the theologian must distinguish between historical evolutions that are "secundum, praeter, et contra evangelium."
24 Concretely, when it comes to a threefold division of the Church's office: "Cette distinction ne se fonde donc pas, elle non plus, sur une 'institution divine,' mais bien sur un développement historique qui s'est joué d'abord en territoire syrien, mais qui est parfaitement légitime."
25
For Küng, episcopate, presbyterate, and diaconate represent a legitimate structuring of the ordained ministry. But the division of functions to which they correspond was not divinely decreed or established. His distinction between divine institution and historical development is obviously crucial. But why is that distinction applicable in this context? Küng explicitly states that the only critical norm he followed in The Church was the truth of the gospel. 26 In context, that seems to mean the written word of the Bible. That written word, then, is the standard with which postapostolic institutions must be compared. As a result of that process of comparison one can recognize whether they are divinely instituted or not. Besides the verdict of the Old and New Testaments, some may think there are other judgments that are beyond appeal when it comes time to weighing the divine-right claims of contemporary institutions. From all appearances Küng does not agree.
There are, however, significantly different interpretations of postapostolic developments as the latter are assessed by other Roman Catholics. One example comes from Raymond Brown, a biblical scholar who has concerned himself with theological difficulties occasioned by the dogmatic definitions of the Church. If one has to propose a formula describing where one can find revelation, instead of saying that all revelation is in Scripture, I would prefer to say: "The revelation of God to men is found in God's action on behalf of man's salvation, as that action is interpreted by the Scriptures themselves and by later authoritative tradition." The importance of the Scripture is that it contains both the narrative of that action and the fundamental interpretation of that action, but there can be subsequent normative interpretation of God's action that is not found in Scripture. The doctrine of the assumption is a normative interpretation of what God has done in Jesus Christ, but that interpretation is not found in Scripture.
27
Thus, for Hans Küng some developments of church order are legitimate, but not for that fact obligatory once and for all. The reason is biblical: they are praeter evangelium, not contra or secundum. For others, developments that are neither contra evangelium nor contained in the Scriptures may become binding interpretations of revelation. Another way of looking at this is to say that Roman Catholics like Küng have come a long way from a position taken by John Henry Newman, namely, that the only thing that could be said to be not in Scripture was what was contradicted by Scripture.
28 A fundamental position of Küng seems to be that where the gospel leaves freedom, the latter cannot be definitively restricted by any legitimate church determination, be the latter in the order of doctrine or of ethical norm. Karl Rahner takes a different position:
He who does biblical theology wishes to say exactly what the Scripture says, yet he cannot simply repeat the words of Scripture. In this respect, it seems to me, the only but essential difference between Protestant and Roman Catholic theology is this: that for the Catholic theologian the logical explanation of the words of Scripture by the Church can definitely become a statement of faith. . . . Let us add this however: that although a logical explanation can become for us an unchangeable dogma, we can see that even then it differs qualitatively from Scripture. Furthermore, not only insofar as it validly binds our faith, but also for its meaning and interpretation, such a formula always looks back to the words of Scripture (or of the original tradition). It is also true that this word of Scripture remains alive and normative only if, through dogmatically binding (logical) explanation, it abides in the ever-changing historical situation. To summarize, Roman Catholic theologians at present do have recourse to the terminology of divine law or right. They use it to express one dimension they believe is realized in certain, though not all, historical realities. The qualification jure divino indicates that the realities in question are held to be more than purely human in origin, and more than divine in the true sense that everything else is as well. Their historical permanence is guaranteed. This does not, however, mean that they are divisible into components, of which some are forever immutable as coming from God while others vary from age to age.
In the process of determining what elements in a historical institution exist by divine right, there is a consensus that the Bible must play a fundamental role. As to the ways in which the Scriptures are normative for a contemporary determination of the divine and immutable in religious institutions, there is still limited agreement. Some Catholics undoubtedly hold for two radically distinct sources of revelation, with tradition independent of Scripture. But even they would not with equanimity refer to the Author of revelation the contradiction that would be involved in having something indisputably contrary to Scripture imposed by divine obligation in tradition. What, however, of those institutions which are neither excluded nor required by the Bible? For some Catholic scholars, there is an evolution within the New Testament itself pointing to (though not spelling out clearly) a subsequent stage of development. The latter would be presumed to be of divine origin because of the Scriptures. Others feel that where this fundamental written law allows freedom, no later determination by the Church can rule it out definitively.
Löhrer is correct. There is no comprehensive study of what Roman Catholics mean when in theologizing today they refer to jus divinum and lay claim to it for some of their rites and institutions. Fides quaerens intellectum is in this case more in via than is regularly the case by the nature of the endeavor.
PRECEDENTS FOR CONTEMPORARY USAGES OF DIVINE LAW
Today, as in the past, Roman Catholic dogmatics regards the sacraments of penance and the Eucharist as biblical in their inspiration. Those two rites, however, have long offered grounds for a discussion of divine law. The reason becomes apparent as soon as one inquires whether there is a sequence that ought to hold between them in the case of the baptized believer who has seriously offended against God and the Church. What is the proper course he should follow? Are sacramental confession of sin and its absolution a prerequisite for his or her reception of the Eucharist?
The affirmative answer given by Catholic theologians since the sixteenth century has not been unqualified. Exceptions were recognized: for example, the impossibility of availing oneself of the sacrament of penance, coupled with an urgency to celebrate or receive the Eucharist. But discussion of exceptions clearly indicates the acknowledgment of a rule. And at this point a problem arises: What is the source of this obligation of previous confession-absolution? Is it purely ecclesiastical law or one that derives more directly from the Author of revelation? Here one is asking something very fundamental: Does a particular sacramental ordering maintained in Church discipline for Roman Catholics arise from the divine will in such a way that it can be interpreted, determined, and confirmed but not abolished by a human legislator in the Church?
A serious study by Louis Braeckmans deals with the historical development of the present canonical regulation from the twelfth century to the years immediately following the Council of Trent. 30 The first period considered runs from Peter Lombard to Luther. A search is made for roots of the obligation that would later be asserted. One source consulted are the commentaries on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. How did authors during this period, those in particular whose works would be published and available to the participants in the Tridentine assembly, interpret Paul's words: "Let a man examine himself and so eat of the bread and drink of the cup" (1 Cor 11:28)?
Examination reveals that, following the example of certain of the early Fathers, many authors in the Middle Ages continued to see in those words of Paul an invitation to an examination of conscience and purification of heart (otherwise unspecified). Others referred briefly to an obligation of prior confession in this context. 31 A study of synods during these centuries shows that some of these, even when dealing with the administration of the sacraments, took no position whatsoever on the confession of serious sins prior to Communion. There are, however, few such after 1215 and the Decree Omnis utriusque of the Fourth Lateran Council. Sometimes the matter was in fact treated but solely in the context of priests celebrating the Eucharist-perhaps assuming that with infrequent reception of that sacrament by the laity, other cases would be taken care of by the fulfilment of the Easter duty. A number legislated solely for the confession of the laity, and finally there are those that legislated for both.
According to Braeckmans' study, the lack of interest in this question on the part of the great canonists in the Middle Ages seems to indicate that the obligation did not have strong support in the collections of Gratian and Gregory IX. One example is crucial. In his commentary on the One factor involved was the disagreement regarding the existence of a biblical foundation for the obligation of prior confession: there was no consensus that 1 Cor 11:28 was then or ever had been considered decisive. 86 Summa de peccatis (Rome, 1524) fol. 24: "Sine confessione autem, si rationabilis subest causa non confitendi, excusatur communicans, quia praeceptum de confessione praemittenda communioni non est de jure divino nee de jure positivo, quum nullibi inveniatur, nisi semel in anno " Considering the case of one who has the opportunity to confess mortal sin before Communion but for a reasonable cause does not, he continues: "Non damno tarnen ipsum peccati mortalis propter rationem dictam." Cf. also Adrian VI, Quaestiones de sacramentis in quartum Sententiarum librum (Rome, 1522) fol. 119: "Sic enim expectans nullo jure, quod ego sciam, prohibetur communicare si vere penitene est." Delay in making one's confession might be motivated, e.g., by a desire to seek the assistance of a more suitable confessor than the one available at the time. A minority view saw nothing seriously objectionable in this procedure or at least did not exclude it as mortal sin.
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Secondly, the way Scripture had been traditionally read in the Church was recognizably different in its application to the two situations in question. 37 The impasse was resolved by asserting vigorously an obligation of prior reception of the sacrament of penance. That requirement was not, however, characterized as one of divine law, whereas the need for confessing mortal sin (without further determination of time and place) would be so described.
After the Council, as before, there were Catholic theologians who interpreted the origin of that obligation of prior confession in radically different ways. Indeed, there were those who invoked Trent itself as having settled the question, whereas the ultimate source of the obligation had in fact been left deliberately unclear.
38 A number of observations may be in order at this point.
The Linguisticality of Christian Faith
One observation has to do with language. Trent resembles Vatican II at least in this: it sought formulae that said something positive but that did not claim to be exhaustive. The importance of those formulae was a consequence both of the linguisticality of Christian faith and of the potentially unitive character of language. A formula-hunter or phrase-coiner may at times find words that win acceptance mainly because those who are united by the language used are committed to so little by it. What Trent said of penance in relation to Communion was not such a case. Despite the disagreement among the participants, that there should be some obligation of prior confession was not the object of dispute. In this the assembly saw itself as one, over against positions attributed to Luther. Furthermore, the working rule at Trent was that disputed scholastic questions would not normally become objects of final decision by the Council. Where theological freedom had reigned before, it was not to be restricted. 39 This did not mean that such questions would never be resolved in the future; it meant that the Tridentine assembly was not about to solve them. When unresolved questions are answered differently by men accepting one and the same formula, there is a difference of understanding among those who hold to the formula. Still, the very attempt at formulation, notwithstanding serious divergencies in understanding on the part of the formulators, is significant. The effort made at Trent shows that those involved were convinced that they held in common more than words. The realities for which the words stood united those confessing the same formula; and the faith expressed in such a stance was thought capable of uniting believers understanding it differently. As a result, the right formula might well be a precondition for reaching a common understanding of the faith in the future. To dismiss this whole procedure as a callous compromise in the face of the harsh reality of division is to miss a whole dimension in what took place. But one thing is sure: Catholic theologians and bishops in the Council could not agree whether a particular obligation was one of divine law or not; and if it was, how it could be.
In the third chapter of Lumen gentium the Second Vatican Council repeated divine-right claims for the hierarchical character of the People of God. 40 The grounds offered for those claims were traditional. This procedure left many theological questions unanswered. Not the least of those questions is, how convincing are those grounds and how good a case do they make for those claims? Notwithstanding silence on this score, the assertions made in chapter 3 do express one conviction: papal primacy and episcopal collegiality are providentially willed for the well-being of Christ's Church. Such language, with all its obvious limitations, has something to commend it. It may help Roman Catholics to work together in an effort to make a more credible and intelligible case for their faith and the institutions they believe the faith demands. 
." (27). Episcopal authority is not weakened by the supreme and universal authority in the Church but is rather strengthened by it, given that the Holy Spirit unceasingly preserves the form of government established in the Church by Christ (27). Ministry in the Church is divinely established (28). Priests exercise their office especially in Eucharistie worship as acting in the person of Christ (28).
That the claims are reasserted is not presently questioned, whatever some may think of their validity. 41 The assumption here is that there may be a fundamental unity in faith without theological agreement as to the probative character of the basis proposed for that faith.
Bible and Tradition as Normative
Something else can be learned from a consideration of precedents. Trent was well aware of this fact: some procedures were legislated by the Church despite the fact that they were not required either by Scripture or by tradition. With regard, however, to the confession of mortal sins committed after baptism, the obligation had its origin not in a canonical source but in the divine will. No consensus, however, could be reached that the same was true of the need to confess mortal sins before Communion. In other words, two contemporary situations were considered and an effort was made to bring the written Word of God to bear on them. In both cases abuses were present in the situations, were recognized as sinful, and in need of elimination. But there were elements in both that were not at odds with God's commands. One was the clear and distinct confession of serious sin to the Church's representatives empowered to mediate divine forgiveness. It was seen as related to the divine will positively and by way of a necessity more fundamental than any resulting from canon law. To be sure, the penitential rite was not a Platonic idea independent of time and circumstances. Joseph of Nazareth had indeed not built the first confessional, and this was well known.
42 But God's will assured the existence of a concrete reality in time and space, namely, a rite ordered to signify and effect the sinful Christian's reconciliation with the Church and God. Such a rite (thus instituted), with all its variations from age to age, would always exist in the Church. The biblical Word brought to bear on the present situation gave rise to this assessment. 43 To be sure, the exegetical and theological methodology are by later standards deficient. On the other hand, the New Testament did not give rise to a similar evaluation when applied to the sacramental sequence required between penance and the Eucharist in the case of a baptized person guilty of mortal sin.
Jus Divinum in Context
What does this tell us of the nature of divine law as operative in the thought-patterns of the theologians and bishops who spoke of it in this context? They too were willing, as is Karl Rahner now, to distinguish between the concrete form and the substance of institutions they regarded as both human and divine in origin and nature.
Calvin himself seems to recognize something of the sort as being the case when he writes of scholastic theologians in the Institutes: ... there has always been a great controversy between the canonists and the scholastic theologians. For the canonists have said that it [confession] was established by positive law, i.e., it was established by church statutes; the theologians have claimed that it was established by God's own law. In this dispute, the theologians have manifested a remarkable lack of prudence in that they twisted and corrupted the scriptural passages, which they cited to their own purpose. And seeing that even in this way they did not accomplish their purposes, those who tried to be more subtle found this way of escape: confession came from divine right in its substance, but took its form from positive law.
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Theologians see the substance or necessary core of penance as coming from God and the form of its celebration from human law. The form is regarded by canonists as so influential that they make it accountable for nearly the whole reality in question. Calvin unquestionably put his finger on a neuralgic point in Catholic discussions.
Positive law was responsible for certain salient features of historical institutions. As a result, in the sixteenth century as now, some found it hard to understand the claim that those institutions exist by divine right. the thesis that the successor of Peter was the only officeholder in the Church who could, with the certainty of faith, be said to have jurisdiction by divine right. It was in this context that he expressed his own notion of divine law. For him, divine law referred to an ordinance communicated not by man but by the Father on Sinai, by Jesus Christ in the Gospels, or by the Holy Spirit through faith and charity in the hearts of the faithful. 48 The difference between divine law in the Old and New Testament is that in the latter it is far more general and much less concerned with contingent details of time, place, measure, etc. 49 Thus, a divine law in the New Testament might well call into existence (and serve as grounds for) an institution that was the only one of its kind. But the law in question would not prescribe in a very detailed way for that institution. Indeed, Lainez thought divine law was related to its historical object in the way a universal idea is related to its concrete referent, with all the variants of time and space that this implies.
A general law requiring that, when possible, serious guilt had to be confessed clearly to the Church was, in the view of Lainez, God's will and therefore jus divinum. So, too, the existence of a universal pastor in the Church depended on a divine institution. But the latter, viewed from the perspective of the concrete exercise of jurisdiction, left concrete details to be worked out in history. It is crucial not to overlook this in the theology of one who was among the most ardent defenders of the Roman primacy. Again, the distinction between the generic nature of an institution and the way it is realized contingently in history seems crucially important.
The conclusion from this example is simple. Roman Catholic bishops and theologians at Trent interpreted God's written Word with direct reference to their day. They brought it to bear on the contemporary rite of penance. As a result, they regarded penance not as the double of an in- Two others cases, however, were different. There was a divine law forbidding the Christian to partake of the Eucharist unworthily. But did this law require in the sixteenth century that sacramental confession of mortal sin precede the reception of the sacrament of the altar? That such confession, when possible, was required there was no doubt. But was it demanded antecedently to church statute? Here there was no agreement. Consequently, the Council did not characterize the obligation as one of divine law. Similarly, bishops were recognized as the ecclesiastical superiors of priests in terms of church leadership. But that this superiority in teaching and governing arose from divine law was again in doubt because of varying historical relations of bishops to the successor of Peter. Here, too, divine-law claims were avoided.
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Hermeneutic and Application
In all three cases the hermeneutics involved came to this. An effort was made to determine what the Word of God, understood at the time by the Church represented in Council, said in its judgment regarding contemporary institutions. But the basis for the judgment was not the Word of God as understood by all who followed the same principles of scientific exegesis or by all holding either a common notion of theology as a science or a similar view of the relation between critical thought and Christian faith. It was rather the Word of God as understood by those sharing the same faith, reading the same Bible out of the same tradition in the same Church, and facing the same realities in a crisis situation. In such circumstances the term jus divinum was applied to some realities, and deliberately not applied to others, by the Catholic Church in Council. Some of the underlying theology has been presented to show what the situation was and what it was not.
It may now be possible to draw a conclusion. Christian faith as Godcentered defies complete articulation but strives for expression nevertheless. As a result, the positive relation of certain historical institutions to the divine will can be affirmed in faith even if the grounds for the relation are not adequately grasped even ideally in such a way as to be compelling. The difficulty theologians experience today in their efforts to isolate elements of divine right in sacraments and church order from contingent, changeable factors is not new. Nor does this difficulty imply that all realities positively related to God's will are related with exactly the same contingency. Jus divinum claims, then as now, were shrouded in the realm of mystery. The role of the Roman Catholic theologian was to bring the light of reason to bear, so as to understand his Church's belief regarding those realities-this by means of exegesis and historical investigation. The goal was to locate the mystery, to relate it to others, to view it in relation to other areas of human experience. But that mystery was not to be rejected or whittled away simply because it exceeded the theological efforts which it evoked. Had that mystery not somehow transcended these efforts, then the divinum in jus divinum would have been a misnomer. Efforts to establish divine-right claims in the past deserve to be viewed in this context; otherwise they are misunderstood. There is a lesson here, one worth considering in investigating divine-right claims made for present institutions in the Roman Catholic Church.
THEOLOGICAL METHOD, CATHOLIC FAITH, AND DIVINE-RIGHT CLAIMS OF THE ROMAN PRIMACY
An attempt has been made to indicate various usages of jus divinum in the writings of contemporary Roman Catholic theologians.
51 Then instances from the past were cited. They showed that this is not the first time Roman Catholics have felt both the conviction and the obscurity of their faith. This was likewise the result of previous efforts to state precisely which concrete elements in their institutions they regarded as of divine right.
52 It now remains to point out an easily overlooked application which this has to an ecumenical reassessment of the divine-right claims of the Roman primacy.
Since the days of the First Vatican Council in particular, Roman Catholic dogmatics has presented the bishop of Rome as much more than the central figure in church structure and discipline. Divine-right claims have in fact been made regarding his jurisdiction over the universal Church. Indeed, they have been specifically related to and grounded in the Bible and tradition, however the latter pair may have been delineated. Therefore, both for Roman Catholics and for other Christians, dialogue today must include the recognition of one fact. Such claims have not been re- Nicaenum it is impossible to relate all the articles to clear biblical premises giving rise to them by way of logical necessity. Notwithstanding, their connection with the Bible is credible. But the connection is not of such a sort that there is no need for a faith-decision recognizing the truth of the New Testament in the words of the Creed. Arguing against any syllogistic nexus between articles of subsequent creeds and biblical confessions is the fact that the creeds not infrequently contain terms the Bible does not. The Nicene homoousion is a case in point. A new term in the conclusion indicates that the logic, whatever its nature, is not recognizably syllogistic. Now one may retort to this that such creedal articles follow from the biblical confession of Christ and from another premise indicating that what the conclusion says in its terms is what the Bible says in other terms. As a believer, I accept this equivalence as true. But to argue for a deductive paradigm of development in such a way seems to beg the question in the minor premise. That question has to do with how one asserts with the binding force of faith that the Son presented one way in the New Testament and the Son presented in a different way in the Nicene Creed are indeed one and the same. To assume the compatibility or mutual inclusiveness of both presentations in a minor premise is begging the question. For this reason the dilemma is not solved by arguing that everything said of the Father in the New Testament is said as well of the Son "excepto Patris nomine." One who so reasons is a better witness to the faith than a theologian explaining accurately the concrete development the faith legitimately went through at Nicaea.
Of course, one may also argue for a theory of development arising from strictly inductive logic. This means maintaining that what is said in various contexts in the New Testament regarding the Son leads to the generalization that He is indeed God in the sense of Nicaea. A case for this approach involves a considerable task: it involves settling one by one the manifold problems that keep arising as a result of ongoing research into the historical basis for the variety in the New Testament presentations of Jesus Christ. The last needed word has not yet been spoken on the conclusive character of this approach.
I am arguing that other Christians besides Roman Catholics find themselves confronted today with the results of an information explosion. As a result, there are unanswered questions that are at the same time closely connected with the validation of the truth claims of the faith professed by Christians. How deal with those questions? Not by assuming that the validation of later expressions of faith is to be sought primarily in deductive or inductive processes of reasoning linking those expressions with biblical premises or the explicit testimony of tradition. Today, proofs in theology and efforts to show the reasonable, historical grounds for the faith and the institutions that are called for by God's word are recognized more and more as not being of that sort.
55
A conclusion would seem to follow. In a dialogue the question facing Catholics and other Christians regarding the Roman primacy should not be: How can Catholics establish it conclusively from Scripture? Such a validation should not be expected unless a theory of development is espoused in which deductive or inductive logic provides the sole applicable rules.
The question raised should rather be: What grounds do Roman Catholics have for their conviction that in the papacy there is a Petrine function which is not a purely human creation? It should not be surprising if they confess they do this on the basis of Scripture but simultaneously admit they cannot establish their position conclusively even to their own satisfaction at present. This admission would attest to their renewed dedication to the task of making the Bible the soul of all sound theology. Nor should their position be reckoned a disavowal of scientific theologizing. It is not the function of the Christian theologian to establish apodictically a necessary sequence between earlier and later expressions of the faith that his or her church professes. He must, however, try ceaselessly to show that the case for real continuity is not irrational and has intellectually respectable arguments to corroborate it. I think a fair number of Roman Catholic exegetes and dogmaticians are effectively doing this today in their studies on the normative character of Scripture and the historical grounds for the divine-right claims of the Roman primacy. What some have already suggested on this score 56 does not seem to be rejected by other serious scholars. 57 The unresolved questions regarding succession in the Petrine function indicate one thing: historical studies and philosophical sharpening or nuancing of concepts like "succession" are an unfinished task. But that task can be one of seeking a fruitful, contemporary understanding of faith in the permanent character of Peter's function in the Church. 
